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The Importance of Director External and Internal Social Networks to Stock Price 
Crash Risk 
 
Abstract: Prior research documents that information transmitted via director networks affects 
firms’ policies and real economic activities.  We explore whether information flow through 
director networks influences managers’ ability to hoard bad news.  We find that the extent of 
external connections of the board of directors is negatively associated with future stock price 
crash risk.  Additional analysis implies that this evidence is driven by firms with more powerful 
executives, with weaker auditor monitoring, or subject to strong investor protection, and by 
directors with greater monitoring incentives or responsibilities, with less firm-specific 
knowledge, and with more valuable reputations to protect.  We further find that director external 
network size is negatively associated with a variety of bad new hoarding signals.  Collectively, 
our research lends empirical support for the monitoring view under which better informed 
directors narrow the scope for bad news hoarding evident in stock price crash risk.  In another 
series of tests, we fail to find evidence consistent with the information leakage view under which 
directors pass sensitive firm-specific information to connections who trade on the information 
before its public release.  Other analysis helps dispel the concern that the endogenous match 
between directors and companies is spuriously responsible for our core results.  In contrast to our 
strong, robust evidence on the role that director external networks play, we only find some results 
implying that CEO-director internal networks shape stock price crash risk. 
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1. Introduction 
We extend prior research on the determinants of stock price crash risk to include director 
external and internal social networks.1   Among different interpretations of stock price crash, bad 
news hoarding proposed by Jin and Myers (2006) has emerged as the theoretical underpinning 
of most empirical studies.  This theory holds that compensation, reputation, and career concerns 
motivate the manager to withhold current bad news in hopes of camouflaging it with future good 
news.  A core assumption underlying the bad news hoarding perspective is that the manager has 
at least partial control over the release of firm-specific bad news.  Although extensive prior 
research is grounded in this theory, little is known on whether information from alternate sources 
could undermine the manager’s control over bad news and attenuate stock price crash risk.   
We examine the role that director social networks play in shaping crash risk.  We focus on 
board directors given their responsibility for alleviating agency conflicts stemming from 
managers’ informational advantage by ensuring more transparent disclosures (Armstrong, Guay, 
and Weber 2010).  Director social networks encompass both external and internal connections.  
We specify director external networks as the aggregate social ties between directors of the firm 
and executives, officers, and directors of other firms, and internal networks as a common 
education background shared between directors and the CEO of the firm. 2  Director social 
networks may affect crash risk in several ways.  First, information flowing from external social 
networks to directors supplements the existing information set of directors, who can leverage 
                                                          
1 As an important determinant of asset pricing, stock price crash risk explains a significant portion of the 
market-level equity premium (Gabaix 2012), and affects variation in firm-level cross-sectional expected 
returns and option prices (Yan 2011; Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels 2013).   
2 We focus on CEO-director education ties because social networks formed through a common education 
background forge strong bonds with enduring impacts since people self-selecting into the same education 
institution are more alike (e.g., communication is easier among more homophilous people), and shared 
educational experiences may engender some common beliefs (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; 2010; 
Shue 2013).  Additionally, alumni events provide an opportunity for these people to interact, potentially 
reinforcing their social connections (He, Pittman, Rui, and Wu 2017). 
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such information to enforce timelier disclosure of bad news in their monitoring role (Fama 1980; 
Fama and Jensen 1983).  Social networks facilitate information transfer by improving the quality 
and flow of information, particularly for actors with better connections (Haythornthwaite 1996; 
Jackson, Rogersy, and Zenou 2016).  Consistent with this informational role, prior research finds 
that information exchange through networks of corporate decision-makers affects real economic 
activities.3  Given that stock price crash risk stems from the manager’s bad news hoarding that 
impedes information transfer through formal channels (Jin and Myers 2006), information 
compiled by directors through alternate informal channels, including social networks, could 
alleviate the manager’s monopoly over information and deter bad news hoarding.  Consequently, 
we expect a lower stock price crash risk for firms with better connected directors.  We label this 
mechanism as the monitoring view of the network-crash risk link.    
Second, prior research implies that information could also flow from directors to 
connections in their external social networks (Cohen et al. 2008; Akbas, Meschke, and Wintoki 
2016).  It is plausible that directors may deliberately or inadvertently transmit sensitive bad news 
about the firm to their connections in external networks who subsequently trade on it (Akbas et 
al. 2016), or profit from the information themselves through insider trading (Cao, Dhaliwal, Li, 
and Yang 2015).  Such informed trading accelerates the impounding of bad news into stock prices 
and dampens market reactions to the public announcement.  As such information flow 
disseminates the bad news through leakage from directors to social networks, we term this 
mechanism as the information leakage view of the network-crash risk link.  Although both 
perspectives predict a negative association between director networks and stock price crash risk, 
                                                          
3 For example, a firm’s external social networks affects its operating, investing, and financing policies (Shue 
2013; Fracassi 2017), the investment returns of mutual fund managers and informed traders (Cohen et al. 
2008; Akbas et al. 2016), analyst recommendations (Cohen et al. 2010), and merger and acquisition outcomes 
(Ishii and Xuan 2014).   
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timelier disclosures under the monitoring view generate greater benefits to average investors 
than the informed trading under the information leakage view. 
Third, director internal connections with the CEO stemming from a common education 
background could affect the information that the CEO shares with directors and, in turn, stock 
price risk.  Since social networks foster interpersonal relations by promoting trust, bonding, 
allegiance, and the norm of reciprocity (Buskens 2002; Granovetter 2005), the CEO may supply 
higher quality firm-specific information to connected directors, facilitating tougher monitoring.  
However, mutual obligations and caring shared by network actors (Silver 1990), as well as the 
dynamic of punishments and rewards in repeated interactions among network actors (Buskens 
2002), could impede a director from strictly disciplining a socially tied CEO against hoarding bad 
news.  Supporting this bonding role, prior research finds that social ties between the CEO and 
board members undermine the monitoring function of the board.4 
However, injecting additional tension into our analysis, managers’ incentives and ability 
to withhold bad news may be insensitive to director connections for several reasons.  First, 
directors may conclude that information coming from informal channels such as networks is 
unreliable or irrelevant.  Second, given that it is difficult to verify the exact information set of 
directors collected through informal social networks, failing to act upon such information may 
not directly increase directors’ legal liability, particularly when the information is potentially 
noisy.  Third, if well-connected directors over-extend themselves by serving on multiple boards, 
                                                          
4 Prior studies document that CEO-director social ties typically have negative consequences, including less 
effective monitoring by the board and audit committee (Hwang and Kim 2009; Fracassi and Tate 2012; 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2014; Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014), lower financial reporting quality 
(Krishnan, Raman, Yang, and Yu 2011; Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014), and a greater incidence of 
corporate fraud (Khanna, Kim, and Lu 2015). 
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their busyness may undermine their monitoring performance (Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lel 
2014).  Accordingly, the link between director social networks and crash risk remains unclear. 
Examining 28,531 firm-year observations spanning 2000-2015, we find a strong, robust 
negative association between director external network size and future stock price crash risk.  
Reflecting its first-order economic importance, as director external network size rises from the 
25th to 75th percentile, future stock price crash risk falls, on average, by 26.85% of the sample mean.  
This result holds when we control for a comprehensive set of crash risk determinants, or match 
firms based on the extent of bad news to help dispel the concern that our results reflect the lack 
of bad news, rather than the timelier release of bad news, by well-connected firms.    
Next, we deepen our analysis by relying on cross-sectional variation to help distinguish 
between the competing explanations.  If the monitoring view prevails, then we would expect 
results to be concentrated in the presence of stronger incentives or greater demand for monitoring.  
Alternatively, if the information leakage view dominates, then the impact should be more 
pronounced in the presence of greater opportunities for informed trading.   At the firm level, we 
find that the results are concentrated in firms with more powerful CEOs, firms with CEOs who 
are more capable of bad news hoarding, firms with weaker alternative monitoring by the auditor, 
and firms subject to stronger shareholder rights protection.  At the director level, we find that the 
results are mainly driven by independent directors who have stronger incentives to monitor, by 
audit committee members who have greater responsibility to monitor, by directors who will 
suffer greater reputational loss from a monitoring failure, and by directors lacking firm-specific 
knowledge who benefit more from information transferred through networks.   
To further explore the mechanisms at work, we also directly test whether director social 
networks affect timelier bad news disclosure.   We find that director external social networks are 
negatively associated with multiple bad-news-hoarding channels or signals, including 
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opaqueness, discretionary accruals (both positive and negative), the incidence of meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts via accrual manipulation, real earnings management, and the short 
interest ratio.  These results reconcile with the interpretation that better informed directors 
constrain the bad news hoarding that is behind stock price crashes.  Using multiple measures of 
informed trading, including the short interest ratio, option trading volume to stock trading 
volume ratio, PIN score, inside trading, and institutional ownership, we fail to find that our main 
results vary with informed trading. Collectively, our analysis lends support to the monitoring, 
rather than the information leakage view.  In shifting gears to focus on internal connections, we 
also find a negative, albeit weaker, relation between CEO-director education ties and crash risk.  
Although director networkswhich are routinely formed in the fairly distant pastare 
exogenous to future crash risk, the hiring of a director with an expansive network could be an 
endogenous firm decision.  We conduct two tests to tackle this threat to reliable inference.  First, 
we exploit the relatively exogenous shifts in board composition induced by director retirement.  
In a difference-in-difference framework, we find that within firms experiencing a director 
retirement, firms with a larger loss in director connections exhibit a greater increase in crash risk 
from the pre- to post-retirement year.  Second, we directly examine whether directors with better 
networks refrain from accepting appointments to companies with greater ex ante stock price crash 
risk.  We fail to find any evidence supporting this perspective, implying that it is unlikely that the 
endogenous company-director match is spuriously responsible for our results.  
We make several contributions to extant research.  First, we gauge the role that alternative 
information sources play in crash risk.   Prior research extensively examines whether crash risk 
is shaped by financial reporting quality (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian 2009; Kim, Li, and Zhang 
2011a; Kim and Zhang 2014; DeFond, Huang, Li, and Li 2015; Kim and Zhang 2016; Zhu 2016; 
Ertugrul, Lei, Qiu, and Wan 2016; Lobo, Wang, Yu, and Zhao 2017), and the manager’s incentives 
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and characteristics (Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011b; He 2015; Callen and Fang 2015a; Kim, Wang, and 
Zhang 2016).  However, most studies implicitly assume that the manager controls the release of 
bad news due to her information monopoly, and that the board critically depends on the manager 
for firm-specific information (Adams and Ferreira 2007), ignoring the presence of alternative 
information channels.5  Our results support the intuition that information shared through social 
networks complements the existing information set of directors, weakens the information 
monopoly of the manager, reduces the incentives and ability of the manager to hoard bad news, 
and attenuates stock price crash risk.   
Second, despite the negative consequences of stock price crash for investor welfare and 
market stability (e.g. Yan 2011), extant research only identifies a few formal control mechanisms 
that curtail such extreme downside tail risk, including conditional accounting conservatism (Kim 
and Zhang 2016), effective internal controls over financial reporting (Lobo et al. 2017), and stricter 
monitoring by auditors (Callen and Fang 2017).  Our research has practical implications for firms 
eager to improve their corporate governance.  In evaluating prospective directors, firms could 
consider the role that director social networks play in preventing bad news hoarding that is 
behind stock price crashes. 
                                                          
5 In an exception, Kim, Li, Lu, and Yu (2016) conjecture that investors can infer a firm’s performance and 
potential bad news from analyzing the disclosures of its comparable peers, with this enhanced 
understanding reducing the manager’s incentive and ability to withhold bad news.  Consistent with 
expectations, they report a negative association between the financial statement comparability of a firm 
and expected crash risk.  We complement Kim et al. (2016) in that they focus on an alternative information 
source via formally disclosed financial statements of peer firms, whereas we concentrate on information 
transferred through competing informal information channelssocial networks.  Additionally, our results 
have different implications from that of Kim et al. (2016).  First, in terms of alleviating crash risk, financial 
statements comparability mainly benefits sophisticated investors who can identify comparable firms and 
discern managers who likely withhold bad news, whereas director social networks potentially help to 
enforce the timelier release of bad news that benefits all investors.  Second, a firm cannot alter financial 
statement comparability of its peer firms, but has control over board appointments.  As such, our results 
have more direct implications for the protection of average investors and corporate governance practice.   
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Third, prior research on information sharing documents certain benefits of director 
external networks for the advising function of the board, including its impact on firm finance 
policy (Fracassi 2017), accounting and stock returns (Larcker, So, and Wang 2013), and terms of 
loan transactions (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2012).  In contrast, extant research seldom 
examines whether director external networks affect the monitoring functionan important 
question given prior evidence that the two roles compete for directors’ time and task focus 
(Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2011).  Our evidence implies that director external ties also 
strengthen the monitoring function by constraining bad news hoarding, consistent with the 
narrative that information acquired through external ties complements both functions (Kim, 
Mauldin, and Patro 2014).  In contrast, information stemming from the manager engenders a 
trade-off between the two functions (Adams and Ferreira 2007).6    
Fourth, prior research on CEO-director internal ties mostly focuses on its dark side, 
including its negative impact on monitoring (Krishnan et al. 2011; Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014; 
Khanna et al. 2015) and firm performance (Hwang and Kim 2009; Fracassi and Tate 2012; Coles 
et al. 2014).  We document that such ties also benefit firms by improving information exchange 
that manifests in lower stock price crash risk.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews prior theory and evidence in 
motivating the testable predictions.  Section 3 outlines the empirical design and sample 
construction.  Section 4 covers the results, while Section 5 concludes. 
                                                          
6 Adams and Ferreira (2007) model the dual role of the board as advisor and monitor of the manager.  In 
their model, the CEO faces a trade-off in sharing firm-specific information with the board.  On one hand, 
better information sharing potentially improves the effectiveness of board advising, enhancing firm value.  
On the other hand, better informed boards, particular better informed independent boards, also impose 
tougher monitoring on the manager (Chen, Cheng, and Wang 2015).  Consequently, the CEO may be 
reluctant to share information with independent boards.  In contrast, information acquired from director 
external networks does not involve this trade-off, implying that such information benefits both the advising 
and monitoring functions. 
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2. Motivation 
2.1. Prior Research on Crash Risk 
Jin and Myers (2006) model crash risk from an agency standpoint.  They hold that opacity 
rather than poor investor protection leads to stock price crash.  Given their career and 
compensation concerns, managers have both the incentive and ability to hide bad news stemming 
from temporary bad performance by at least partially controlling public access to information 
about firm fundamentals.  The increased opacity, in turn, facilitates bad news hoarding.  
However, in the limit, as accumulated bad news reaches a tipping point, it is suddenly released 
to the market at once, leading to a large drop in stock price, or a crash.  Jin and Myers (2006) 
report empirical evidence consistent with their prediction.   
In primarily relying on the agency perspective proposed in Jin and Myers (2006) to explore 
the determinants of stock price crash risk, prior empirical research implies that ex post realized 
stock price crash risk increases with opacity measured with absolute discretionary accruals 
(Hutton et al. 2009), particularly accruals in more recent years and less reliable accruals associated 
with operating assets (Zhu 2016).  Crash risk rises when the scope for bad news hoarding is 
greater evident in the presence of complicated tax strategies (Kim et al. 2011a), less readable and 
more ambiguous annual reports (Ertugrul et al. 2016), real earnings smoothing (Khurana, Pereira, 
and Zhang 2017), stronger incentives for withholding bad news arising from managerial stock-
based compensation (Kim et al. 2011b) or claw back provisions in executive compensation (Bao, 
Fung, and Su 2017), CEO overconfidence (Kim et al. 2016), or high stock liquidity owing to 
transient investor sales upon bad news disclosure (Chang, Chen, and Zolotoy 2016).7   
                                                          
7 Other studies attempt to broaden our understanding of stock price crash from the standpoint of market 
dynamics.  Miller (1977) and Hong and Stein (2003) demonstrate that investor opinion divergence leads to 
the overvaluation of stocks when opinions of bearish investors remain hidden due to short sale constraints.  
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Since stock price crash increases volatility and uncertainty and erodes investor 
confidence, it is important to understand the control mechanisms that can curtail such extreme 
downside tail risk.  Prior research identifies several such formal control mechanisms, including 
more timely recognition of bad news under conditional accounting conservatism that constrains 
managers’ ability to withhold adverse private information (Kim and Zhang 2016), effective 
internal controls over the financial reporting system (Lobo et al. 2017), the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards that impose tougher requirements for financial 
reporting quality (DeFond et al. 2015), and tighter monitoring by external auditors through long-
term auditor-client relationships (Callen and Fang 2017).8 
Given that crash risk critically hinges on the extent to which the manager can conceal 
adverse information from internal and external monitors and investors, it is crucial to consider 
whether alternative information sources, such as social networks, weaken the incentive and 
capacity of the manager to withhold bad news.  We help close this gap in extant research. 
2.2 Prior Research on Social Networks 
Social networks influence economic activities for at least three reasons.  First, it affects the 
flow and quality of information since people tend to have more trust in information coming from 
personal connections (Granovetter 2005).  Second, under the social norm of reciprocity, social 
                                                          
It is more likely that this accumulated hidden information is divulged during market declines, leading to 
stock price crashes.  Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) find that stock price crashes are preceded by a large 
trading volume and high past returns, consistent with investor opinion divergence and stock price bubbles 
contributing to crashes.  Another potential cause for crash risk is default risk, as firms near default more 
likely release bad news leading to price crash (Zhu 2016).  However, prior research fails to find any positive 
association between crash risk and default risk measured by either financial leverage or bankruptcy risk 
(Hutton et al. 2009; Zhu 2016). 
8 Besides formal monitoring mechanisms, prior research also explores a variety of informal institutional 
structures and finds that crash risk subsides with the CEO’s aversion to downside risk stemming from their 
inside debt holdings (He 2015), a firm’s financial statement comparability (Kim et al. 2016), levels of 
religiosity (Callen and Fang 2015a), performance in corporate social responsibility (Kim, Li, and Li 2014), 
and a firm’s proximity to SEC headquarters (Kubick and Lockhart 2016). 
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networks act as a major source of reward and punishment.  Third, repeated interactions among 
actors in the network foster trust and mutual understanding (Granovetter 2005).     
Prior research documents that external ties improve information flow among connected 
firms and affect their real economic activities.  For example, research finds that firms tend to adopt 
more similar policies if their executives graduate from the same MBA section of Harvard Business 
School (Shue 2013), or if their executives and directors are connected through current and past 
employment, education, and other activities (Fracassi 2017), consistent with enhanced 
information flow among tied firms.  Firm directors and officers also transfer information to other 
important market participants via networks.  Such information transfer along the education 
network prompts better performance by mutual fund managers and financial analysts on stocks 
of connected firms (Cohen et al. 2008, 2010), and lower interest rates offered by connected banks 
(Engelberg et al. 2012) as a result of better information flows and monitoring rather than 
favoritism of connected deals.  Cross-firm social connections could also have downsides, 
including negative acquisition performance when the target is tied to the acquirer firm (Ishii and 
Xuan 2014), and greater wage premia for better connected CEOs as compensation for their 
informational advantage (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2013).9   
Prior research implies that internal ties between the CEO and directors undermines board 
monitoring and firm performance.  Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that powerful CEOs tend to hire 
directors socially tied to them, and CEO-director ties are associated with lower firm value and 
more value-destroying acquisitions.  Such appointment-based CEO-director ties are also linked 
to weaker board monitoring (Coles et al. 2014) and higher fraud risk (Khanna et al. 2015).  In 
return, CEOs enjoy excessive compensation and exhibit lesser pay-/turnover-performance 
                                                          
9 Other research documents network effects on the performance of venture capitalists (e.g., Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007), as well as on investment decisions of individuals (e.g., Hvide and Östberg 2015). 
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sensitivity when they are socially connected to directors who appear independent by 
conventional standards (Hwang and Kim 2009; Nguyen 2012).   
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
2.3.1 Director external networks and crash risk 
Social networks operate as an important conduit for information exchange.  Network 
theory suggests that the position of an actor in the network affects the extent of information 
exchange.  Actors with a larger sized network and highly connected actors have greater access to 
information resources (Haythornthwaite 1996), and are more likely to take on the role of a hub in 
the network (Jackson et al. 2016).  Importantly, hub-like actors are well-positioned to collect and 
control private information, which they can exploit to their advantage.   
Consistent with external networks transmitting value-creating information, prior research 
finds that external ties improve the advising function of the board (Larcker et al. 2013; Fracassi 
2017; Engelberg et al. 2012).  Since both advising and monitoring improve when the board is 
better informed (Adams and Ferreira 2007), and that the two functions are potentially 
complementary (Kim et al. 2014), we anticipate that information exchanged through external 
networks also facilitates monitoring by the board.   
Depending on the direction of information flow, director external networks could affect 
crash risk through two mechanisms.  Under the monitoring view, information travels from 
networks to directors, enabling them to better monitor the manager.  Specifically, boards with 
more expansive networks access more comprehensive and timelier information about the current 
operations and future outlook of the firm, such as the launch of a new product by peer firms that 
potentially accelerates obsolescence of the firm’s existing products, deteriorating financial 
conditions of major customers, tightening of the lending policy of major capital providers, the 
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pending acquisition of an important supplier, potential strategic alliances among competitors, 
upcoming regulatory restrictions, loss of major customer contracts, etc.  Such knowledge 
complements the existing information set of directors, ensuring that they are in a better position 
to evaluate the risks, threats, and uncertainty faced by the firm that, in turn, makes it harder for 
the manager to conceal bad news.  Consequently, managers are more inclined to disclose bad 
news in the presence of a well-connected and better informed board.  In the other direction, 
information collected from informal social networks will not be useful if it is unreliable or does 
not pertain to the specific firm.  Moreover, to the extent that it is difficult for outsiders to clearly 
observe the private information directors collected through their networks, failure to act upon 
such private information by directors may not increase their legal liability.10   Further, well-
connected directors may become over-extended by serving on multiple boards, with their 
busyness undermining their monitoring role (Falato et al. 2014).  Last, well-connected directors 
who already enjoy strong reputations may relax their managerial monitoring if the cost of 
intensive oversight no longer justifies any additional benefit (Guedj and Barnea 2009).   
Under the information leakage view, material non-public information about the firm 
flows from directors to firm outsiders through director networks.  Despite extensive laws, 
regulations, and corporate policies prohibiting the release of private information and exploiting 
such information for trading, leakage could still occur inadvertently through unguarded 
interactions between a director and connections in networks, or by sophisticated traders piecing 
together information from multiple sources in their information search (Borgatti and Cross 2017).   
In examining abnormal trading returns of network connections, prior research implies that 
                                                          
10 For example, Baum, Larcker, Tayan and Welch (2017: 3) stress that: ”Under the business judgment rule, 
courts have ruled that in the absence of “red flags” outside directors are permitted to rely exclusively on 
information provided by management, and if they do so, courts will assume a hands-off posture even if 
the board decision is clearly wrong.” 
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privileged information flows from directors to mutual fund managers, short sellers, option 
traders, and institutional investors (Cohen et al. 2008; Akbas et al. 2016).  In particular, Akbas et 
al. (2016) find that sophisticated traders better anticipate earnings surprises of highly connected 
firms, and that a higher fraction of negative news concerning such firms is already impounded in 
prices before the announcement.  If such leakage accelerates the incorporation of bad news into 
the market, it should alleviate the market surprise when bad news is publicly released.11  We 
expect under both the monitoring and information leakage views that crash risk will subside 
when director external networks are larger, which we formalize in this alternative hypothesis: 12 
H1: There is a negative association between the size of director external social networks 
and stock price crash risk. 
 
Although both views predict a negative association between crash risk and director 
external network size, the mechanisms at work as well as implications for investors are 
fundamentally different.  Under the monitoring view, bad news is disclosed through formal 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure channels on a timely basis.  Such disclosure alerts all 
investors and strengthens corporate governance and investor protection.  Under the information 
leakage view, bad news travels discreetly within exclusive networks and the trading on such 
news enriches only the small group of connected investors and corporate insiders.   
2.3.2 Director internal networks and crash risk 
School ties constitute an important type of social network with broad scope and long-
lasting effects.  CEO-director education ties potentially generate opposing effects on crash risk.  
                                                          
11 In contrast to trades executed by market-wide investors on the public release of bad news, trades by a 
small group of connections more likely lead to a gradual correction of stock prices, rather than a crash. 
12 We develop hypotheses within the framework of bad news hoarding proposed by Jin and Myers (2006).  
We recognize that under either the monitoring or information leakage view, more expansive board network 
may not reduce crash risk if the latter is caused by investor opinion divergence (Hong and Stein 2003), 
information blockage (Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer 2002), or other features of market dynamics such as stock 
liquidity (Chang et al. 2016).  
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First, the homophily principle central to social network theory suggests that people feel more 
comfortable when seeking friendship and interacting with those who are similar to themselves, 
and interactions occur more frequently among similar people than among dissimilar people 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).  Shared education experience nurtures a common 
way of thinking and problem solving, engenders bonding and proximity, promotes close 
interaction and support, and fosters trust and information sharing according to social network 
theory (Granovetter 1985, 2005; Buskens 2002).  Although managers are naturally eager to share 
good news with all board members to showcase their performance and increase bargaining 
power, they have particularly strong incentives to withhold bad news out of compensation and 
career concerns (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009).  The sense of kinship and trust makes the CEO 
more inclined to interact with connected directors and openly share with them sensitive private 
information, particularly bad news (Cao, Dhaliwal, Li, and Yang 2015).  Equipped with such 
privileged information, connected directors are in a better position to constrain bad news 
hoarding.  
However, the behavior of actors sharing a social network is governed by communal norms 
which promote mutual caring and trust (Silver 1990).  In undertaking monitoring, a director may 
be concerned about the CEO’s welfare when their business relationship is inextricably mixed with 
their social links (Granovetter 2005). Importantly, trust is dynamic and evolves with repeated 
interactions.  In a repeated trust game, actors are sanctioned for untrustworthy behavior, and 
rewarded with greater trust for trustworthy behavior (Buskens 2002).  The social norm of 
reciprocity and concerns for subsequent consequences could impede a director from effectively 
disciplining the manager with personal ties.  Additionally, given that the CEO may be inclined 
to appoint directors with personal ties (Fracassi and Tate 2012), the endogenous selection of tied 
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directors may enhance CEO power and weaken board monitoring (Hermalin and Weisbach 
1998).  Prior research generally finds that CEO-director social ties undermine board monitoring.13  
Under the information leakage view, insider trading by connected directors on private 
bad news accelerates the incorporation of bad news into the market.   In support of this intuition, 
Cao et al. (2015) report that connected directors earn higher returns from open-market sales, but 
not from open-market purchases, than unconnected directors.  Further, the net sales of connected 
directors predict future bad news for up to three quarters, suggesting insider trading of connected 
directors may preempt future public announcement of bad news.   
In summary, we expect an ambiguous relationship between CEO-director ties and bad 
news hoarding under the monitoring view, but anticipate a negative relationship under the 
information leakage view.  Consequently, we formalize the following null hypothesis:  
H2: There is no association between CEO-director social ties and stock price crash risk. 
3. Sample, Variable Measurement and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Data Sources and Sample 
Our sample period starts in 2000, the earliest year with data available in BoardEx for 
director networks, and ends in 2015, the latest year with complete data to measure one-year-
ahead variables. In addition, we collect: 1) stock return data from the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP); 2) accounting data from COMPUSTAT annual files; 3) analyst information 
from I/B/E/S; 4) institutional ownership data from Thompson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 
Database; and 5) audit-related data from Audit Analytics.  We exclude observations with non-
positive total assets and equity book values, observations with year-end share prices less than 
                                                          
13 In particular, prior research finds CEO-director social links are associated with a lower likelihood of 
directors dissenting on proposals initiated by management or large shareholders (Wei, Hualin, and Shan 
2016).   
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one dollar, and observations with fewer than six months of stock return data.  Our final sample 
consists of 28,531 firm-year observations for the years 2000 to 2015 inclusive. 
3.2. Measure of Director Social Networks 
We measure director social networks using two metrics based on director’s external and 
internal connections.  We follow Akbas et al. (2016) in specifying our external-connection measure, 
which reflects a variety of links through schools attended, current and previous employers, 
military service and civic activities.  More specifically, we first aggregate at the board level each 
director’s social connections with officers and directors of other firms obtained from BoardEx, 
and then regress the natural logarithm of board-level total external connections on the natural 
logarithms of firm size, board size, firm age, number of analysts, and institutional ownership.  We 
rely on the residual values from the cross-sectional regressions to proxy for board-level director 
external social networks (CONNECTEDNESS).  This approach helps ensure that our measure of 
director networks is not driven by potentially correlated firm characteristics, and helps attenuate 
potential coefficient bias on CONNECTEDNESS arising from any omitted variables correlated 
with these firm attributes.  The second measure is an internal-connection through school ties 
(Cohen et al. 2008, 2010), specified as the natural logarithm of the total number of board members’ 
connections with the CEO through prior education (BOARD_CEO_TIE). 
3.3. Measures of Firm-Specific Crash Risk 
Firm-specific daily returns are a critical input into calculating various metrics of firm-
specific stock price crash risk.  We follow Jin and Myers (2006) in estimating firm-specific daily 
returns from this expanded market and industry index model regression for each firm and year:  
,                                  (1) 
where rjt is the raw value of return on stock j in day t, rmt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted 
market index on day t, and rit is the return on the value-weighted industry (i.e., the two-digit SIC 
1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 3 4 5 ( 1) 6 ( 1)jt j j m t j i t j mt j it j m t j i t jtr r r r r r rα β β β β β β ε− − + += + + + + + + +
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code) index.  To account for non-synchronous trading, we include lead and lag terms for the 
value-weighted market and industry indices in the regression (Dimson 1979).  The firm-specific 
daily return, Rjt, is defined as the natural log of one plus the residual return from Equation (1).  
We log transform the raw residual returns to reduce the positive skew in the return distribution 
and help ensure symmetry (Chen et al. 2001).14   
After extensive prior research (e.g., Chen et al. 2001; Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; 
Callen and Fang 2015a), we calculate three measures of (ex post) firm-specific crash risk for each 
firm-year observation.  Our first measure is the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW), i.e., 
the negative of the third moment of each stock’s firm-specific daily returns (𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) divided by the 
cubed standard deviation.  Thus, for any stock j over the fiscal year T,   
,                                                           (2) 
where n is the number of observations for stock j during the fiscal year T.  The denominator is a 
normalization factor (Greene 1993). 
Our second measure is the down-to-up volatility of firm-specific daily returns (DUVOL) 
calculated as follows: 
,                                                                     (3) 
where nu and nd are the number of up and down days over the fiscal year T, respectively.  For any 
stock j over a one-year period, we denote days with firm-specific daily returns above (below) the 
mean of the period as the “up” (“down”) sample.  We further compute the standard deviation 
for each sample separately. DUVOL is the log ratio of the standard deviation of the “down” 
sample to the standard deviation of the “up” sample.  
                                                          
14 Our results (untabulated) remain robust if we measure firm-specific crash risk based on raw residual 
returns. 
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Our third measure is the number of days with negative extreme firm-specific daily returns 
minus the number of days with positive extreme firm-specific daily returns (COUNT).  A firm-
specific daily return is treated as a negative (positive) extreme return if it exceeds 3.09 standard 
deviations below (above) the mean firm-specific daily return over the fiscal year, with 3.09 
selected as a cut-off to yield frequencies of 0.1 percent in the normal distribution (Hutton et al. 
2009).  In our empirical tests, we employ one-year-ahead NCSKEW (NCSKEWT+1), DUVOL 
(DUVOLT+1), and COUNT (COUNTT+1) as the dependent variables. 15 
3.4. Research Design and Control Variables 
 To test the predictions in H1 and H2, we estimate the following regression:  
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑇𝑇+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑇𝑇 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 +
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑇𝑇+1,                                                                                               (4)                        
where CRASHRISKT+1 is measured by NCSKEWT+1, DUVOLT+1, and COUNTT+1 in successive 
estimations.  All regressions control for year and industry fixed-effects.  We estimate the models 
using pooled Ordinary Least Squares with White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.  
We focus on the role that CONNECTEDNESS and BOARD_CEO_TIE play in future crash risk.16 
We follow prior research by controlling for these variables in the regressions (Chen et al. 
2001; Jin and Myers 2006): NCSKEWT, defined as the negative coefficient of skewness for firm-
specific daily returns in fiscal year T; KURT, defined as the kurtosis of firm-specific weekly returns 
in fiscal year T; SIGMAT, defined as the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns in fiscal 
year T; RETT, defined as the cumulative firm-specific weekly returns in fiscal year T; MBT, defined 
as the market-to-book ratio at the end of fiscal year T; LEVT, defined as the book value of all 
                                                          
15 Higher values of NCSKEW, DUVOL and COUNT imply higher crash risk. 
16 To address potential outliers and data coding errors, we winsorize all continuous variables at 1st and 99th 
percentiles except for the dependent variables, consistent with Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al. (2009).  
Our core evidence is nearly identical without winsorizing.      
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liabilities divided by the total assets at the end of fiscal year T; LNSIZET, defined as the log of 
market value of equity at the end of fiscal year T; ROAT, defined as the operating earnings divided 
by the book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year T; and DTURNT, defined as the average 
monthly share turnover over fiscal year T minus the average monthly share turnover over the 
year T-1, where monthly share turnover is calculated as the monthly share trading volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding over the month.  
Consistent with Hutton et al. (2009), we include financial reporting opacity (OPAQUET), 
computed as the annual performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley 2005).17  To control for real earnings management, we include abnormal production costs 
(ABN_PRODT), abnormal discretionary expense (ABN_DISEXPT), and abnormal cash flow from 
operations (ABN_CFOT) (Francis, Hasan, and Li 2016).  We also control for the presence of 
dividend payments (DIVT) (Kim, Luo, and Xie 2016), auditor tenure (TENURET), firm age (AGET) 
(Callen and Fang 2017), Big Four auditor (BIGNT) and industry specialist (SPECT) auditor status 
(Lim and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010).  We control for analyst coverage (ANAT) since Chen 
et al. (2001) find that firms with greater analyst coverage suffer more crashes in the future.  We 
follow Callen and Fang (2013, 2015b) by controlling for the short interest ratio (SIRT) and 
institutional ownership (INSTT).  Finally, we include the strength of SEC monitoring 
(DISTANCET), which equals to one if the distance between a firm’s headquarters and the closest 
SEC regional or national office is within 100 kilometers, and zero otherwise (Kedia and Rajgopal 
2011).  In Appendix A, we summarize the variable specifications. 
3.5. Descriptive Statistics 
                                                          
17 We also use a modified Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality measure in Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper (2005) to measure firm-level reporting quality, and the results (untabulated) remain robust. 
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In Table 1, we present in Panel A descriptive statistics for key variables used in our 
regressions. The mean values of future stock price crash risk measures NCSKEWT+1, DUVOLT+1, 
and COUNTT+1 are -0.0794, -0.1194, and -0.3229, respectively.  The mean value and standard 
deviation of NCSKEWT+1 and DUVOLT+1 are similar to those reported in prior work (e.g., Chen et 
al. 2001; Callen and Fang 2015a, 2015b). The mean value and standard deviation of 
CONNECTEDNESS are 0.0015 and 0.6015, respectively, comparable to the corresponding 
statistics of 0.0011 and 0.5192 reported in Akbas et al. (2016).  
Panel B provides a Pearson correlation matrix for the key variables under study. Our 
future stock price crash risk measures, NCSKEWT+1, DUVOLT+1, and COUNTT+1, are predictably 
all significantly and positively correlated with each other.  Importantly, CONNECTEDNESS is 
significantly negatively correlated with all three of the future crash risk measures at the 1% level 
(two-tailed), consistent with H1 regarding a negative association between director external social 
networks and crash risk.  The correlation coefficients between BOARD_CEO_TIE and all three 
future crash risk measures are significant and positive, providing no preliminary support for H2 
that there is no association between CEO-director social ties and crash risk.  Reinforcing prior 
research, all crash risk measures are significantly correlated with a number of firm-level variables. 
4. Empirical Tests 
4.1. Main Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
In Table 2, to gauge the role of director external networks and director-CEO ties, we report 
the results where we include both CONNECTEDNESS and BOARD_CEO_TIE in the same 
regressions.  Across all three specifications of future stock price crash risk, the coefficients on 
CONNECTEDNESS are negative and significant at the 1% level (t-statistics= -3.08, -3.99, and -3.01, 
respectively).  In contrast, the results on BOARD_CEO_TIE are much weaker with its coefficients 
negative and significant at the 10% and 5% levels in only two out of the three specifications (t-
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statistics= -1.52, -1.74 and -2.53, respectively).  To calibrate economic importance, we follow prior 
research by comparing the crash risk when CONNECTEDNESS and BOARD_CEO_TIE are set at 
the 25th and 75th percentile of the sample.  On average, the decreases in stock price crash risk 
corresponding to this interquartile shift is 26.85 percent of the sample mean across the three 
alternative measures of crash risk for CONNECTEDNESS, and is 14.88 percentage of the sample 
mean across the two alternative measures of crash risk for BOARD_CEO_TIE.18,19  
The estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally highly significant in the 
predicted directions across all three crash risk models.  Specifically, consistent with Chen et al. 
(2001) that growth stocks, stocks with high trading volume, stocks of large firms, and stocks with 
greater analyst coverage are more likely to crash, MB, DTURN, LNSIZE, and ANA load 
significantly positive.    We observe significantly negative coefficients on LEV and positive 
coefficients on OPAQUE, in line with Hutton et al.’s (2009) results suggesting that tighter lender 
monitoring of highly leveraged firms constrains managerial bad news hoarding and that opaque 
firms are more likely to crash.  In addition, the coefficients on ABN_PROD and ABN_DISEXP are 
significantly positive, reinforcing Francis, Hasan and Li’s (2016) evidence that firms orchestrating 
real earnings management are more prone to crash.  Reconciling with the learning-by-monitoring 
perspective of auditor-client relationships in Callen and Fang (2017), TENURE enters negatively.  
Finally, similar to Callen and Fang (2013) and Kubick and Lockhart (2016), the coefficients on 
INST and DISTANCE load in the predicted directions across all three columns.   
                                                          
18 The specific percentage changes for one-year-ahead NCSKEW, DUVOL, and COUNT are 50.30 percent, 
17.88 percent, and 12.37 percent, respectively, as CONNECTEDNESS rises across the interquartile range. 
The specific percentage changes for one-year-ahead DUVOL and COUNT are 12.71 percent and 17.04 
percent, respectively, as BOARD_CEO_TIE increases across the interquartile range. 
19 Since independent directors are likely to focus more intently on monitoring that disciplines firms against 
bad news hoarding, we re-estimate the regressions in Table 2 after replacing external networks of all 
directors (CONNECTEDNESS) with that of independent directors (CONNECTEDNESS_IndepD).  In 
untabulated results, we find that across all three regressions, the coefficients for both 
CONNECTEDNESS_IndepD and BOARD_CEO_TIE are consistently negative and significant. 
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In short, the findings in Table 2 uniformly support the narrative that the extent of 
aggregate director external networks is associated with lower future stock price crash risk.  We 
also provide evidence implying that director-CEO connections constrain crash risk, although the 
results are considerably weaker and sensitive to the crash risk measure under study.   
In Table 3, we report evidence from examining whether our core results are materially 
sensitive to analyzing a different measure of external connections, adding control variables to the 
regressions, and evaluating competing explanations.  In Panel A, we measure stock price crash 
risk with NCSKEWT+1.  First, although CONNECTEDNESS as constructed in Akbas et al. (2016) is 
orthogonal to the five firm attributes, it may admit measurement error of unknown severity.  For 
example, even when the extent of a firm’s board external connections remains stable, 
CONNECTEDNESS will vary with changes in firm attributes.  To alleviate this issue, we re-
specify CONNECTEDNESS as the raw value of board external connections in Column (1).  Second, 
disclosures of comparable firms is another alternate information source, as investors can infer a 
firm’s potential bad news from disclosures of its comparable peers (Kim et al. 2016).  In Column 
(2), we control for the firm-year measure of financial statement comparability in De Franco, 
Kothari, and Verdi (2011).20  Third, prior studies suggest that financial reporting opacity has a 
first-order impact on stock price crash risk (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim and Zhang 2014; Zhu 2016).  
In Column (3) and (4), we supplement our measure of opacity (OPAQUE) with accrual quality 
(Dichev and Dechow 2002) and F-score (Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan 2011), respectively.  Prior 
research implies that undertaking complex tax strategies exacerbates opacity, leading to greater 
crash risk (e.g., Kim et al. 2011a).  In Columns (5), we control for corporate tax avoidance with the 
cash effective tax rate.  In these regressions, we find that CONNECTEDNESS continues to load 
                                                          
20 We thank Professor Verdi for providing the financial statement comparability score at  
http://mitmgmtfaculty. mit.edu/rverdi/. 
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negatively at the 5% level or better despite the major sample attrition in some estimations.  In 
contrast, we only find some supportive evidence for BOARD_CEO_TIE.   
Last, board connections affect firm policy (Shue 2013; Fracassi 2017).  The superior 
advisory function performed by well-connected directors may translate into better performance, 
which, in turns, lowers the incidence of bad news.  It follows that our main results could reflect 
the absence of bad news, rather than the timelier release of bad news by well-connected firms.  
To confront this competing explanation, we measure the extent of bad news released to the 
market with one-year-ahead stock returns, assuming that observations with future stock returns 
in the bottom tercile of the full sample (low-return subsample) release more bad news than 
observations in the top tercile (high-return subsample).  This partition allows us to match 
observations based on the extent of bad news.  If the main results are due to the accelerated release 
of bad news by well-connected firms, CONNECTEDNESS should load negatively mainly for the 
low-return subsample where bad news is more concentrated, but not for the high-return 
subsample where bad news is more sparse.  Supporting this intuition, we find that 
CONNECTEDNESS enters negatively at the 1% level for the low-return subsample in Columns 
(6), and fails to load for the high-return subsample in Column (7).  Moreover, we directly examine 
whether board connections are associated with the extent of bad news release by substituting 
future stock returns for crash risk as the dependent variable.  If firms with better connected boards 
release less bad news, then we would expect to observe a positive relation between 
CONNECTEDNESS and future stock returns.  In untabulated results, we find that 
CONNECTEDNESS has no perceptible impact on future stock returns (t-statistic=-0.46).  
Collectively, our evidence is consistent with well-connected firms hoarding less bad news, rather 
than having less bad news in the first place.  In Panels B and C, we find very similar results when 
we measure stock price crash risk with DUVOLT+1 and COUNTT+1, respectively. 
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4.2. Cross-sectional Analyses – Monitoring Explanation 
In this section, we deepen our analysis by striving to identify the factors that prompt cross-
sectional differences in the economic consequences of director networks to investors.  Our 
predictions on the links between director networks and future firm-specific crash risk are 
grounded conceptually in: (i) agency conflicts between managers and shareholders engendering 
managerial bad-news-hoarding; and (ii) directors remaining eager to detect and deter this 
behavior.  Accordingly, we examine whether the impact of director networks on future crash risk 
hinges on both the severity of agency conflicts and the degree of directors’ monitoring incentives, 
evident in CEO characteristics; external monitoring by professional auditors; the protection of 
shareholders’ rights; and director characteristics.  To provide direct evidence on the underlying 
mechanism, we also analyze whether director networks are associated with various channels and 
signals of bad news hoarding. 
4.2.1 CEO Characteristics 
Managerial agency conflicts arising from the separation between ownership and control 
in U.S. firms (Jensen and Meckling 1976) motivates examining whether the relation between 
director networks and future crash risk becomes stronger when firms experience worse agency 
conflicts stemming from CEO power and CEO ability.   
Prior research implies that director networks will have a larger impact on constraining 
crash risk when CEO power is high.  Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) 
suggest that managers are reluctant to share information with directors since they may use such 
information to tighten their monitoring of managers.  Similarly, Lisic, Neal, Zhang and Zhang 
(2016) argue that a powerful CEO is more apt to provide the board with low-quality information 
or less information, which undermines the monitoring process.  Friedman (2014) develops an 
agency model holding that a powerful CEO can extract rents by manipulating financial reporting 
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to exaggerate firm performance. Abernethy, Kuang and Qin (2015) document that powerful CEOs 
exploit their influence over corporate policy in pursuing private benefits.  It follows that a more 
powerful CEO will be more likely to engage in bad-news-hoarding activities and, in turn, 
directors will be more likely to rely on the knowledge obtained from their own networks in 
helping identify and deter managers from suppressing bad news in this situation. 
A similar rationale applies to CEO ability.  Recent evidence implies that managerial ability 
is a major determinant of firm-level manipulation.  Koester, Shevlin, and Wangerin (2016) and 
Habib and Hasan (2014) find that firms with superior managerial ability exhibit more tax 
avoidance and more severe empire building in the form of overinvestment, both of which 
facilitate managerial bad news hoarding (Kim et al. 2011a; Kim et al. 2016).  
Consequently, we predict that the impact of director networks on future crash risk is more 
salient when a firm’s CEO has more power or ability to suppress information by withholding 
firm-specific bad news.  Rooted in prior research (e.g., Abernethy et al. 2015; Finkelstein 1992; 
Coles et al. 2014; Lisic et al. 2016), we employ principal component analysis to determine a 
unidimensional construct from the following six items: (i) the number of board committees on 
which the CEO serves; (ii) the length of the CEO’s tenure; (iii) whether CEO is a company founder; 
(iv) board size; (v) the fraction of directors appointed after the CEO assumes office (i.e. co-opted 
directors); and (vi) the equity stakes held by the largest five institutional investors.  We create a 
factor score that weighs the relative importance of each of the observed items (CEO_POWER).  
The value of the composite measure increases with the level of CEO power.  We follow Demerjian, 
Lev and McVay (2012) by gauging CEO ability (CEO_ABILITY) based on their efficiency at 
generating greater output from a given set of inputs.  We re-estimate Equation (4) after separately 
interacting CONNECTEDNESS and BOARD_CEO_TIE with CEO_POWER and CEO_ABILITY. 
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We provide the regression results in Table 4.  The estimate coefficients on the interaction 
term CONNECTEDNESS* CEO_POWER are negative and significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
across the three crash risk specifications. Similarly, the interaction term CONNECTEDNESS* 
CEO_ABILITY loads negatively at the 10% and 5% levels for DUVOLT+1 and COUNTT+1, 
respectively, although this variable is statistically indistinguishable from zero when we specify 
NCSKEWT+1 as the dependent variable.  This evidence implies that the role that director external 
social networks play in shaping future crash risk varies systematically with CEO characteristics.  
In contrast, we do not obtain similar results when we interact BOARD_CEO_TIE with 
CEO_POWER and CEO_ABILITY, respectively. 
4.2.2 External Monitoring by Professional Auditors 
Extensive prior research suggests that litigation and reputation concerns motivate 
professional auditors to closely monitor clients’ reporting choices that might mask bad news 
versus good news (e.g., Lys and Watts 1994; Heninger 2001; Barron, Pratt, and  Stice 2001).  Callen 
and Fang (2017) find robust evidence that the term of the auditor-client relationship is negatively 
related to one-year-ahead stock price crash risk.  Their analysis lends support to the monitoring-
by-learning perspective in that development of client-specific knowledge over the course of the 
auditor-client relationship enhances auditors’ ability to detect and deter bad news hoarding 
activities, thereby reducing future crash risk. 
Moreover, extant research suggests that, relative to non-specialist auditors, industry 
specialist auditors, which focus intently on developing their expertise and protecting their 
valuable reputations, conduct higher-quality audits (e.g., Knechel, Naiker, and Pacheco 2007; Lim 
and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010).  Relevant to our research questions, Robin and Zhang 
(2015) report an inverse relation between auditor industry specialization and stock price crash 
risk, implying that high-quality auditors can directly benefit investors by reducing tail risk.  We 
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expect that the impact of director networks on future crash risk is less salient for firms with strong 
external monitoring measured by longer audit-client relationships and the presence of specialist 
auditors given that managers in these firms likely have a narrower scope to engage in bad news 
hoarding.  We examine this issue by re-estimating Equation (4) after adding the interaction terms 
CONNECTEDNESS *TENURE, CONNECTEDNESS *SPEC, BOARD_CEO_TIE *TENURE and 
BOARD_CEO_TIE *SPEC. 
The results reported in Table 5 include that the coefficient estimates on the interaction 
term CONNECTEDNESS*TENURE are positive and significant at the 5% level or better across all 
three crash risk specifications.  Similarly, we find that the estimate coefficients on the interaction 
term CONNECTEDNESS*SPEC are positive and significant at the 10% level or better.  This 
evidence implies that the importance of director external social networks to crash risk varies with 
the strength of external monitoring by professional auditors.  In sharp contrast, we find that the 
interactions of BOARD_CEO_TIE with TENURE and SPEC have no perceptible impact. 
4.2.3 Protection of Shareholders’ Rights 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the protection of shareholders’ rights plays a major 
role in persuading directors to strictly monitor managers.  We expect that the impact of director 
networks on future crash risk is concentrated in firms subject to the stronger investor protection.  
We initially capture investor protection with the governance index (GINDEX) derived by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which is based on a count of 24 antitakeover provisions set 
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).21  Higher value of GINDEX reflect lax 
                                                          
21 The IRRC collects and reports data about every two years (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 
2006).  Like Gompers et al. (2003), we assume that the index remains constant in the year(s) following the 
most recent report for years in which IRRC does not report GINDEX. 
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corporate governance, fewer shareholder rights, and poor shareholder protection.  We code LO_G 
as one for observations having a GINDEX value below the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
Our second measure of investor protection is based on the staggered adoption of universal 
demand laws (UDL) at the state level.  Houston, Lin, and Xie (2015) suggest that the enactment 
of universal demand law compromises shareholders’ litigation rights against corporate 
management by adding significant obstacles to derivative lawsuits, causing shareholders to 
experience worse agency conflicts.  They find that in the aftermath of the passage of UDL, firms’ 
equity financing costs rise and their accounting transparency deteriorates.  We set NOUDL to one 
if a firm is headquartered in a state that has not adopted universal demand law by year T, and 
zero otherwise.  We re-estimate Equation (4) after separately interacting CONNECTEDNESS and 
BOARD_CEO_TIE with LO_G and NOUDL. 
In Table 6, we find that the coefficient estimates on the interaction term 
CONNECTEDNESS*LO_G enter negatively at the 5% level or better across all three crash risk 
specifications. Similarly, the interaction term CONNECTEDNESS*NOUDL is negative and 
significant at the 10% level or better.  This evidences implies that director external social networks 
have more impact on future crash risk when investor protection is stricter.  However, these results 
do not extend to interacting BOARD_CEO_TIE with LO_G and NOUDL in successive regressions. 
Altogether, the results in Tables 4 to 6 suggest that better informed directors are more 
capable of restricting bad news hoarding in the presence of more intensive agency conflicts 
stemming from managerial power, weaker monitoring by external auditors, and tougher 
shareholders protection.  The evidence collectively supports the monitoring view as an 
explanation for the main findings. 
4.2.4 Director Characteristics 
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Next, we examine whether the role that director networks play in shaping future crash 
risk is sensitive to director characteristics.  In particular, we expect to observe that directors with 
stronger incentives to monitor and directors who stand to benefit more from information 
stemming from networks are more likely to take advantage of their external social networks to 
detect and constrain managerial bad news hoarding, with concomitant implications for 
subsequent stock price crash risk.  Analyzing this issue involves decomposing our measure of 
director external social networks (CONNECTEDNESS) into these four distinct classifications: (i) 
independent directors (CONNECTEDNESS_IndepD) versus non-independent directors 
(CONNECTEDNESS_NonIndepD); (ii) audit-committee directors (CONNECTEDNESS_ 
AuditComD) versus non-audit-committee directors (CONNECTEDNESS_NonAuditComD); (iii) 
short-tenured directors (CONNECTEDNESS_ShortTenD) versus long-tenured directors 
(CONNECTEDNESS_LongTenD); and (iv) high-reputation directors (CONNECTEDNESS_ 
HighRepD) versus low-reputation directors (CONNECTEDNESS_LowRepD).  We classify 
directors as having short (long) tenure if his/her tenure with the current role is below (above) the 
sample median, and classify directors as having high (low) reputation if the total number of 
his/her directorship held at other public and private companies is among the top quartile (the 
bottom three quartiles) of the sample distribution.  We anticipate greater monitoring incentives 
for independent directors, audit committee members, and high-reputation directors due to their 
fiduciary responsibility and reputation concern, and greater benefits for short-tenure directors 
due to their lack of firm-specific knowledge.  We then estimate an expanded version of Equation 
(4) by including director external network measures for each pair of partitions.   
In Table 7, the coefficient estimates on the connectedness of independent directors 
(CONNECTEDNESS_IndepD), audit committee directors (CONNECTEDNESS_AuditComD), 
short-tenured directors (CONNECTEDNESS_ShortTenD), and high-reputation directors 
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(CONNECTEDNESS_HighRepD) are all significant at the 10% level or better across all 12 
specifications.  However, the coefficient estimates on the connectedness for non-independent 
directors (CONNECTEDNESS_NonIndepD), non-audit committee directors 
(CONNECTEDNESS_NonAuditComD), long-tenured directors (CONNECTEDNESS_ LongTenD), 
and low-reputation directors (CONNECTEDNESS_LowRepD) are significant at the 10% level or 
better only among six out of the 12 specifications.  In almost all comparisons (Model 11 is the lone 
exception), the economic magnitude of the coefficients on the connectedness terms for 
monitoring-type directors are larger than that for non-monitoring-type directors.  The evidence 
lends additional support for the monitoring perspective as the primary mechanism at work.  
4.2.5 Verification of Bad News Hoarding 
The premise underlying the relation between director social networks and crash risk is 
that these networks influence managerial bad news hoarding.  However, we naturally cannot 
directly observe whether managers engage in bad news hoarding.  In order to help empirically 
validate the underlying premise, we examine whether director social networks are associated 
with several bad-news-hoarding channels or signals documented in prior research (Hutton et al. 
2009; Kim et al. 2011a; Callen and Fang 2015b; Zhu 2016; Francis et al. 2016): (i) opaque financial 
reporting (OPAQUE); (ii) positive and negative discretionary accruals (POS_DA and NEG_DA); 
(iii) meeting and beating analyst forecasts using discretionary accruals (MBEAT); (iv) real 
earnings management (ABN_PROD, ABN_DISEXP, and ABN_CFO); (v) tax avoidance 
(CASH_ETR); and (vi) short interest ratio (SIR).  
In this analysis, we regress the variables listed above on the two measures of director 
social networks (i.e., CONNECTEDNESS and BOARD_CEO_TIE), a series of firm characteristics 
variables in Equation (4), and industry and year fixed effects.  In Table 8, we generally find that 
firms with a higher value of CONNECTEDNESS are associated with lower opaqueness, lower 
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positive and negative discretionary accruals, a lower probability of meeting/beating analyst 
forecasts via discretionary accruals, lower abnormal production, greater discretionary 
expenditures, and a lower short interest ratio (t-statistics= -1.75, -5.55, -1.80, -2.15, -3.79, 2.58, and 
-3.18, respectively).  The evidence is consistent with a negative link between director external 
social networks and channels/signals for bad news hoarding, lending additional support to the 
monitoring view as an explanation for the main results.  In stark contrast, we do not observe any 
negative relations between BOARD_CEO_TIE and the bad-news-hoarding variables in Table 8. 
4.3 Cross Sectional Analyses - Information Leakage Explanation 
Although the results reported earlier provide strong, robust support for the monitoring 
explanation, these findings do not rule out the non-mutually-exclusive information leakage 
explanation. Accordingly, we next conduct additional analyses to examine whether the 
documented negative relation between director social networks and stock price crash risk reflects 
information leakage from directors to outsiders as well. 
We conjecture that for firms with a higher level of informed trading, information leakage 
from directors to outsiders is more likely to occur, implying that the impact of social networks on 
crash risk will be larger in this situation.  After prior research (e.g., Brown and Hillegeist 2007; 
Akbas et al. 2016), we measure informed trading with these four variables: (i) the short interest 
ratio (SIR); (ii) the ratio of total monthly put and call trading volume to stock trading volume 
(OPTION/STOCK VOL); (iii) the probability of informed tradinge (PIN);22 and (iv) insider trades 
(INS_TRADE), which is the dollar value of net insider trading, scaled by firm size.23 We re-
                                                          
22 We obtain the PIN data from http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data. 
23 In another specification, we include the interactions between CONNECTEDNESS and BOARD_CEO_TIE 
with institutional ownership.  The results on the interaction terms remain insignificant.  
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estimate Equation (4) after interacting CONNECTEDNESS and BOARD_CEO_TIE with each of 
the four informed trading measures in successive regressions. 
In Table 9, we find that all of the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms between 
CONNECTEDNESS and the measures of informed trading are statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels across all three crash risk specifications.  Similarly, almost all of the coefficient 
estimates on the interaction terms between BOARD_CEO_TIE and the measures of informed 
trading are insignificant across all the three crash risk specifications. This evidence suggests that 
director social networks do not play a more pronounced role in shaping future crash risk in the 
presence of a higher level of informed trading.  Collectively, our analyses provide strong support 
for the monitoring view and no support for the information leakage view.  
4.4 Endogenous director-company match  
Director networks are routinely formed through their educational, professional, and civic 
experience long before they join the company, implying that it is unlikely that firm characteristics 
shape director networks.  However, as directors with large networks may refrain from serving 
on boards of firms with serious stock price crash risk given their reputation and litigation 
concerns, it is important to confront that our core evidence may spuriously stem from the 
endogenous match between companies and directors.  In the main tests, we rely on residual 
connections to temper the impact of firm size, board size, firm age, analyst coverage, and 
institutional ownership.  Next, we further tackle threat to reliable inference of other firm 
characteristics that may drive the director-company match.   
4.4.1 Director retirement 
In a difference-in-difference (DID) identification strategy, we exploit the exogenous 
reduction in director networks arising from director retirement (Fracassi and Tate 2012; Fracassi 
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2017; Ke, Li, Ling, and Zhang 2017). 24   This design effectively controls for time-invariant 
differences between the treatment and control firms, as well as for time-variant trends that are 
common to both groups.  If directors with large networks play a more critical role in constraining 
bad news hoarding, then we would expect a larger increase in crash risk for firms whose directors 
have larger connections before their retirement.  We follow Ke et al. (2017) in coding a director as 
retired if he/she departs the board at the age of 65 or older.  To help dispel the concern that the 
evidence reflects shifting sample composition, we require each firm to have at least one 
observation during both the pre- and post-retirement year.  Among the 211 director retirement 
with requisite data, the mean (median) value of director connections is 473 (142) before they retire.  
We set POSTRETIRE to 1 for the first year after the retirement, 0 for the last year before the 
retirement, and set LARGE_DECREASE to 1 (0) for directors with above (below) the median value 
of network size before retirement.  In Table 10, we report in Columns (1)-(3) of Panel A that the 
coefficient for POSTRETIRE*LARGE_DECREASE enters positively in all three regressions, 
implying that crash risk rises for firms that lose retiring directors with extensive connections. 25   
Central to justifying the DID design is validating the parallel trends assumption under 
which we expect no differential trend in crash risk between the treatment and control groups 
absent the shock from director retirement.  After Lennox (2016), we focus on observations from 
the pre-retirement period and regress crash risk on LARGE_DECREASE, TREND, and 
                                                          
24 Some recent research relies on director deaths as an exogenous shock to board structure (Fracassi and 
Tate 2012; Fracassi 2017; Ke et al. 2017).   Data constraints prevent us from examining director deaths since 
connections are set to zero for the entire sample period in BoardEx for directors who died. 
25 It is possible that firms appointing more reputable directors have higher average connections per director 
and naturally suffer greater loss of connections upon director retirement, and that such firms are inherently 
different from firms that lose fewer connections at director retirement.  We find between these two groups 
of firms, there is no significant difference in the average director connections, average director age, or any 
of the control variables used in our main regression, with the only exception being KUR which is higher 
for the treatment firms at the 10% significance level.  Accordingly, the treatment sample is well-matched 
against the control sample, which is important since the parallel trends assumption is more defensible 
when firms more closely resemble each other. 
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LARGE_DECREASE*TREND. TREND takes the value of -3, -2, and -1 for the corresponding year 
before retirement.  A negative coefficient for the interaction would indicate a decreasing trend in 
crash risk for the treatment group before the treatment.  Untabulated evidence shows that the 
interaction term has no perceptible impact across all three crash risk measures, providing some 
assurance that parallel trend assumption is defensible.26  Although the inclusion of year and 
industry fixed effects in the DID design differences away any time-varying or industry-specific 
effects, we further include firm fixed effects to difference away constant unobservable firm-
specific attributes.  This approach allows the difference between treatment and control group to 
vary across firms.  The firm fixed effects regressions in Columns (4)-(6) yield similar results.27, 28 
                                                          
26 As an alternate approach, we follow Kausar, Shroff, and White (2016) by comparing the level of crash 
risk between the two groups during the three-year period before retirement.  Consistent with the parallel 
trends assumption, we fail to find any distinguishable difference between the two groups.  To further 
mitigate the concern that our results stem from trends preceding or following retirement, we deliberately 
shift the event year to the pre- and post-retirement period.  If we continue to observe the treatment effects 
surrounding the falsified dates, then this would imply that preexisting divergent trends, rather than the 
impact of director retirement, are responsible for our evidence.  Specifically, we compare the treatment and 
control firms between year t-3 and t-2, t-2 and t-1, t+1 and t+2, t+2 and t+3 by designating the second year 
in each pair as the pseudo retirement year.  In unreported results, we find in 11 of the 12 regressions (i.e., 
four comparisons across three crash risk measures) that the term LARGE_DECREASE*POST fails to load; 
we attribute the lone exception to random variation.  Collectively, reinforcing our earlier evidence, the DID 
results likely reflect outcomes stemming from director retirements, rather than the role of other forces.             
27 We do not use firm fixed effects regression, which exploit within-firm changes in the dependent and 
independent variables across time, for the full sample of 28,531 observations.  Reflecting that board 
composition is typically quite sticky across time, 42% observations in the full sample experience no change 
in the raw value of director total connections from year t-1 to t.  The mean within-firm standard deviation 
of CONNECTEDNESS is only 38% of the corresponding standard deviation for the full sample. Such 
persistence in director connections leads to insufficient within-firm variation, undermining the power of a 
firm fixed effects regression in this setting.    
28 In an alternative method, we exploit the relative exogenous shift in board composition stemming from 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activities.  We restrict the analysis to the subsample of firms with M&A 
identified through the SDC Platinum database.  To focus on material M&A, we rely on completed deals 
greater than $10 million and for which the acquirer owns 100% of the target firm after the transaction 
(Masulis, Wang, Xie 2007).  To implement a DID design,  we set POSTMA to 1 (0) for the year immediately 
after (before) the M&A transaction, and set LARGE_INCREASE to 1 if the change in the acquirer board 
network size is above the sample median value, and 0 otherwise.  The interaction term POSTMA_LARGE_ 
INCREASE captures the incremental change in crash risk for acquirers with larger increases in director 
networks from the pre- to post-M&A period relative to acquirers with smaller increases.  In untabulated 
evidence, we find that POST_LARGE_INCREASE loads negatively in two of the three crash risk regressions.  
Overall, we observe some evidence that acquirers with a larger increase in director networks enjoy a steeper 
decline in crash risk from the pre- to post-merger and acquisition period. 
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4.4.2 Stock price crash risk and subsequent changes in director networks 
The alternative explanation of endogenous director-company match predicts a negative 
association between future changes in director networks and past crash risk.  After recent 
research on board attributes (Badolato, Donelson, and Ege 2014; Larcker et al. 2013), we directly 
test this explanation by regressing changes in director networks from year t-1 to t 
(∆CONNECTEDNESS) on the lagged values of three measures of crash risk and all control 
variables in Equation (4).  We use the prior-year crash risk since it is observable to directors who 
contemplate joining or departing the company.  In Table 10 Panel B, we find in Columns (1)-(3) 
that the coefficients on all three lagged crash risk variables are statistically insignificant and nearly 
identically zero.  It is possible that only more reputable directors with large networks and, in turn, 
more employment options are more selective concerning the boards on which to serve.  In an 
untabulated test, we restrict the analysis to observations with the addition or departure of 
directors whose network size is above the sample median value, and find that the three lagged 
crash risk variables remain insignificant.  Overall, we fail to find any evidence that directors with 
large networks are less likely to match with firms with greater ex ante stock price crash risk, 
inconsistent with endogenous director-company match driving our main results.   
5. Conclusions 
 
The agency costs perspective of manager bad news hoarding proposed by Jin and Myers 
(2006) is a widely-accepted explanation for future stock price risk.  However, despite the large 
crash risk literature built on this premise, evidence on whether information from alternate 
channels weakens the manager’s control of bad news remains scarce.  We help fill this void by 
analyzing whether boards with large social networks, which potentially facilitates information 
sharing, better constrain the bad new hoarding responsible for future stock price crashes.   
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Our analysis suggests that the external networks of the boards effectively attenuate future 
crash risk, with this link varying predictably with firm and director characteristics.  At the firm 
level, the results are more pronounced for firms with more powerful and competent CEOs who 
are more capable at withholding bad news, and firms subject to stronger shareholder protection 
rights; also consistent with expectations, the results are weaker for firms enjoying stricter 
monitoring from their auditors. At the director level, our evidence is mainly driven by directors 
who: have stronger incentives or responsibility to monitor, will benefit more due to their lack of 
firm-specific knowledge, and have more valuable reputations to protect.  Exploring the 
underlying channels, we find that director external social connections are negatively associated 
with a battery of channels and signals for bad news hoarding.  We fail to find evidence that our 
main results are driven by firms with greater informed trading. Collectively, we provide robust 
evidence consistent with the monitoring view and no empirical support for the information 
leakage view.  We also find that CEO-director social connections have a negative, although 
considerably weaker, association with future stock price risk.   
Overall, the evidence suggests that information exchange via director networks weakens 
the information monopoly of the manager, constraining them from suppressing bad news that, 
in turn, engenders stock price crash risk.  Future research could explore how internet information 
intermediaries, who have positive capital market impacts (Drake, Thornock, and Twedt 2017), 
facilitate the flow of information.  This analysis could broaden our understanding of the role that 
alternative information channels play in shaping stock price crash risk.    
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Appendix A 
Variable definitions 
 
Measures of Stock Price Crash risk: 
NCSKEW is the negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal year.   
DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard deviation of firm-specific daily returns for the 
“down-day” sample to standard deviation of firm-specific daily returns for the “up-day” sample 
over the fiscal year. 
COUNT is the number of firm-specific daily returns exceeding 3.09 standard deviations below 
the mean firm-specific daily return over the fiscal year, minus the number of firm-specific daily 
returns exceeding 3.09 standard deviations above the mean firm-specific daily return over the 
fiscal year; 3.09 represents frequencies of 0.1 percent in the normal distribution. 
We estimate firm-specific daily returns from an expanded market and industry index model 
regression for each firm and year (Hutton et al. 2009):  
tj,1ti,j6,1tm,j5,ti,j4,tm,j3,1ti,j2,1tm,j1,jtj, εrβrβrβrβrβrβαr +++++++= ++−− ,                                          
where rj,t is the return on stock j in day t, rm,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market 
index in day t, and ri,t is the return on the value-weighted industry index based on the two-digit 
SIC code.  The firm-specific daily return is the natural log of one plus the residual return from the 
regression model above. 
 
Measures of Director External and Internal Social Networks: 
CONNECTEDNESS is the regression residual obtained from regressing the natural logarithm of 
aggregate director connections on the natural logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number 
of analysts, and on institutional ownership. 
BOARD_CEO_TIE is the natural logarithm of total number of board members’ connections with 
the CEO through prior education. 
 
Other variables: 
KUR is the kurtosis of firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal year. 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal year.   
RET is the cumulative firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal year, multiplied by 100.   
MB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year.   
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LEV is the book value of all liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year.   
LNSIZE is the log value of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year.   
ROA is the operating earnings divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year.   
DTURN is the average monthly share turnover over the fiscal year minus the average monthly 
share turnover over the previous year, where monthly share turnover is calculated as the monthly 
share trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding over the month.   
OPAQUE is the 3-year moving sum of the absolute value of annual performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals developed by Kothari et al. (2005). 
ABN_PROD is the abnormal level of production costs developed by Roychowdhury (2006). 
ABN_DISEXP is the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures developed by Roychowdhury (2006). 
ABN_CFO is the abnormal level of cash flow from operations developed by Roychowdhury (2006). 
DIV is an indicator equal to one if a firm has dividend payout for the fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise. 
TENURE is the number of consecutive years in the fiscal year that the auditor has been employed 
by the firm (in the case of audit firm mergers, the incumbent auditor–client relationship is 
considered to be the continuation of the prior auditor).   
AGE is the number of years that the firm has been listed on Compustat since 1950. 
BIGN is equal to 1 if a firm is audited by a Big-4 auditor (or its predecessor), and zero otherwise. 
SPEC is equal to one when an auditor has the largest industry market share in the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. 
ANA is the log value of one plus the number of analysts that issue earnings forecasts for a given 
firm during the fiscal year. 
SIR is the number of shares sold short divided by total shares outstanding from the last month of 
fiscal year, with a range from 0 to 1. Compustat Supplemental Short Interest File provides the 
available data to calculate short interest. 
INST is the percentage of a specific firm’s equity held by institutional investors at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
DISTANCE equals to one if the distance between the county where a firm is headquartered and 
the closest SEC regional or national office is within 100 km, and zero otherwise.   
CEO_POWER is a composite measure based on principal component analysis of: (i) the number 
of board committees on which the CEO serves; (ii) the length of the CEO’s tenure; (iii) whether 
the CEO is a company founder; (iv) board size; (v) the proportion of board members who are 
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appointed after the CEO assumes his office (i.e., co-opted directors); and (vi) the percentage of 
shares owned by the largest five institutional investors of the firm.  
CEO_ABILITY is a continuous measure of CEO ability developed in Demerjian, Lev and McVay 
(2012). 
LO_G equals to one if the index of Gompers et al (2003) is less than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise.  
NOUDL equals to one if the firm is headquartered in a state without the state-level adoption of 
universal demand law in the current year, and zero otherwise.  
OPTION/STOCK VOL is the ratio of total monthly put and call trading volume to stock trading 
volume.  
PIN is the probability of informed trade developed by Brown and Hillegeist (2007).  
INS_TRADE is the value of net insider sells divided by firm size. 
POS_DA is equal to performance-adjusted discretionary accruals if its value is greater than zero, 
and zero otherwise. 
NEG_DA is equal to performance-adjusted discretionary accruals if its value is less than zero, and 
zero otherwise. 
MBEAT equals to one if positive performance-adjusted discretionary accruals are used to meet or 
beat analyst earnings forecast, and zero otherwise, based on Davis, Soo, and Trompeter (2009). 
CASH_ETR is cash taxes paid scaled by pretax book income after removing the effects of special 
items. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of key variables of interest for the sample of firms included in our 
study. The sample covers firm-year observations with non-missing values for all variables for the period 
2000 to 2015. Panel A presents descriptive statistics; Panel B presents a Pearson correlation matrix.  Bold 
values indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.  All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
              
 N Mean Standard Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
NCSKEWT+1 28531 -0.0794 1.7088 -0.6964 -0.1326 0.4484 
DUVOLT+1 28531 -0.1194 0.6988 -0.5108 -0.1306 0.2658 
COUNTT+1 28531 -0.3229 1.7397 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CONNECTEDNESS 28531 0.0015 0.6015 -0.3320 0.0603 0.3941 
BOARD_CEO_TIE 28531 0.3028 0.3697 0.0000 0.0000 0.6931 
NCSKEW 28531 -0.0127 1.4914 -0.6508 -0.1335 0.4200 
KUR 28531 8.7231 12.6763 2.2205 4.4441 9.6831 
SIGMA 28531 0.0272 0.0152 0.0169 0.0237 0.0338 
RET 28531 -0.0005 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001 
MB 28531 3.3054 4.2061 1.3940 2.2029 3.6349 
LEV 28531 0.4540 0.2126 0.2847 0.4539 0.6059 
LNSIZE 28531 20.2392 1.9206 18.9237 20.2293 21.5448 
ROA 28531 0.0961 0.1680 0.0629 0.1168 0.1693 
DTURN 28531 0.0034 0.0987 -0.0295 0.0011 0.0344 
OPAQUE 28531 0.1694 0.1432 0.0804 0.1300 0.2087 
ABN_PROD 28531 -0.0375 0.2221 -0.1522 -0.0373 0.0682 
ABN_DISEXP 28531 -0.0828 0.3025 -0.2417 -0.0825 0.0387 
ABN_CFO 28531 0.0622 0.1697 -0.0171 0.0542 0.1411 
DIV 28531 0.3668 0.4819 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TENURE 28531 11.6048 9.0610 5.0000 9.0000 16.0000 
AGE 28531 20.0645 10.0364 11.0000 18.0000 29.0000 
BIGN 28531 0.7873 0.4092 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
SPEC 28531 0.4158 0.4929 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
ANA 28531 1.6739 0.9776 0.6931 1.7918 2.4849 
SIR 28531 0.0421 0.0558 0.0045 0.0227 0.0554 
INST 28531 0.5830 0.3289 0.3195 0.6687 0.8545 
DISTANCE 28531 0.4703 0.4991 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
NCSKEWT+1 1              
DUVOLT+1 2 0.93             
COUNTT+1 3 0.49 0.67            
CONNECTEDNESS 4 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04           
BOARD_CEO_TIE 5 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08          
NCSKEW 6 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02         
KUR 7 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.30        
SIGMA 8 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 0.07 -0.13 -0.03 0.15       
RET 9 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.11 -0.74      
MB 10 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00     
LEV 11 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.25    
LNSIZE 12 0.11 0.13 0.13 -0.02 0.30 0.07 0.00 -0.55 0.29 0.19 0.21   
ROA 13 0.06 0.09 0.10 -0.13 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.38 0.24 -0.02 0.06 0.34  
DTURN 14 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.16 -0.11 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 
OPAQUE 15 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.30 -0.16 0.10 -0.07 -0.24 -0.16 
ABN_PROD 16 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.18 0.16 -0.09 -0.11 
ABN_DISEXP 17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.19 -0.11 0.14 -0.04 -0.14 -0.20 
ABN_CFO 18 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 -0.20 0.11 0.07 -0.15 0.28 0.44 
DIV 19 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.10 0.03 -0.04 -0.38 0.18 -0.01 0.16 0.36 0.25 
TENURE 20 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.28 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.36 0.14 
AGE 21 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.29 0.14 -0.08 0.14 0.20 0.15 
BIGN 22 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.02 -0.26 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.52 0.15 
SPEC 23 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.15 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.28 0.08 
ANA 24 0.10 0.12 0.12 -0.02 0.27 0.14 0.04 -0.38 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.80 0.25 
SIR 25 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 -0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.10 
INST 26 0.07 0.09 0.09 -0.03 0.13 0.10 0.05 -0.39 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.51 0.26 
DISTANCE 27 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
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 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
OPAQUE 15 0.02             
ABN_PROD 16 -0.02 0.01            
ABN_DISEXP 17 0.05 0.16 -0.46           
ABN_CFO 18 0.02 -0.11 -0.38 -0.34          
DIV 19 0.01 -0.20 0.04 -0.11 0.06         
TENURE 20 0.00 -0.18 0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.33        
AGE 21 -0.01 -0.21 0.09 -0.14 0.02 0.42 0.48       
BIGN 22 0.01 -0.17 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.15 0.31 -0.02      
SPEC 23 -0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.44     
ANA 24 -0.01 -0.19 -0.10 -0.08 0.23 0.16 0.24 0.01 0.47 0.25    
SIR 25 0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.15 0.07 0.28   
INST 26 0.01 -0.21 -0.05 -0.10 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.38 0.19 0.56 0.38  
DISTANCE 27 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 
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Table 2 
Impact of Director Social Networks on Crash Risk 
 
This table estimates the pooled cross-sectional regression of future stock price crash risk on director 
networks. The sample covers firm-year observations with non-missing values for all variables for the 
period 2000 to 2015. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on White standard errors corrected for 
firm clustering. Year and industry fixed-effects are included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Dependent Variable= NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
TEST VARAIBLES       
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0550*** (-3.08) -0.0294*** (-3.99) -0.0550*** (-3.01) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0460 (-1.52) -0.0219* (-1.74) -0.0794** (-2.53) 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
NCSKEW 0.0147* (1.83) 0.0068** (2.13) 0.0090 (1.22) 
KUR 0.0022** (2.22) 0.0005 (1.22) 0.0007 (0.82) 
SIGMA -0.4900 (-0.29) -1.3882** (-2.07) -3.6194** (-2.03) 
RET 24.1777 (1.14) 4.3162 (0.50) 6.2940 (0.29) 
MB 0.0107*** (3.45) 0.0040*** (3.54) 0.0080*** (3.00) 
LEV -0.2079*** (-3.66) -0.0936*** (-4.01) -0.2670*** (-4.55) 
LNSIZE 0.0637*** (5.44) 0.0250*** (5.13) 0.0594*** (4.75) 
ROA 0.2187** (2.31) 0.1752*** (4.79) 0.5216*** (5.70) 
DTURN 0.3240*** (3.02) 0.1711*** (3.85) 0.3187*** (2.82) 
OPAQUE 0.3041*** (3.69) 0.1235*** (3.75) 0.2521*** (3.06) 
ABN_PROD 0.2593*** (3.58) 0.1287*** (4.39) 0.2384*** (3.28) 
ABN_DISEXP 0.1592*** (2.87) 0.0634*** (2.89) 0.1060** (1.99) 
ABN_CFO 0.1406 (1.49) 0.0671* (1.77) 0.1077 (1.10) 
DIV 0.0249 (0.94) 0.0233** (2.17) 0.0152 (0.57) 
TENURE -0.0024* (-1.73) -0.0012** (-2.03) -0.0030** (-2.08) 
AGE -0.0014 (-1.02) -0.0002 (-0.36) 0.0004 (0.27) 
BIGN -0.0172 (-0.51) -0.0134 (-1.00) -0.0212 (-0.62) 
SPEC 0.0020 (0.08) 0.0024 (0.24) 0.0085 (0.36) 
ANA 0.0424** (2.24) 0.0224*** (2.83) 0.0561*** (2.78) 
SIR 0.4659** (2.09) 0.1143 (1.27) 0.2334 (1.06) 
INST 0.1010** (2.43) 0.0369** (2.15) 0.0996** (2.25) 
DISTANCE -0.0482** (-2.18) -0.0303*** (-3.37) -0.0743*** (-3.38) 
INTERCEPT -1.0603*** (-4.58) -0.3894*** (-4.04) -0.9278*** (-3.59) 
Year fixed effects YES  YES  YES  
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES  
N 28531  28531  28531  
adj. R-sq 0.0270   0.0479   0.0445   
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Table 3 
 
Robustness Checks: Sensitivity Tests  
 
This table re-estimates Equation (4) for the pooled cross-sectional regression of future stock price crash risk on director social networks.  Results are 
presented separately for each of our measures of stock price crash risk in Panels A, B and C.  Model 1 re-specifies external social networks with the 
raw value of connectedness. Models 2-5 control for De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011)’s comparability measure, Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s 
accrual quality measure as modified by Francis et al. (2005), Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011)’s F-score measure, and cash effective tax rate, 
respectively. In Models 6 and 7, we present the estimation results after separating our sample into high and low tercile groups based on lead firm-
specific stock performance. To economize on space, all of the control variables (see Table 2) are suppressed.  The sample covers firm-year 
observations with non-missing values for all variables for the period 2000 to 2015.  We report t-statistics in parentheses, based on White standard 
errors corrected for firm clustering.  All models include year and industry fixed-effects.  *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
Panel A: NCSKEWT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Raw value of 
Connectedness 
Control for 
Comparability 
Control for 
DD Accrual 
Control for 
F-score 
Control for Tax 
Avoidance 
Low Lead 
Performance Group 
(Bottom Tercile) 
High lead 
Performance Group 
(Top Tercile) 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0467*** -0.0571** -0.0538*** -0.0521*** -0.0527** -0.1032*** 0.0059 
 (-2.95) (-2.44) (-2.98) (-2.81) (-2.48) (-3.12) (0.23) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0464 -0.0730* -0.0450 -0.0532* -0.0265 -0.1194* 0.0477 
 (-1.53) (-1.87) (-1.49) (-1.68) (-0.77) (-1.91) (1.17) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 28531 17705 28328 26186 21691 9510 9511 
adj. R-sq 0.0270 0.0261 0.0260 0.0277 0.0242 0.0744 0.0155 
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Panel B: DUVOLT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Raw value of 
Connectedness 
Control for 
Comparability 
Control for 
DD Accrual 
Control for 
F-score 
Control for Tax 
Avoidance 
Low Lead 
Performance Group 
(Bottom Tercile) 
High lead 
Performance Group 
(Top Tercile) 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0248*** -0.0272*** -0.0291*** -0.0293*** -0.0272*** -0.0469*** -0.0028 
 (-3.83) (-2.80) (-3.88) (-3.79) (-3.08) (-3.61) (-0.22) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0221* -0.0337** -0.0218* -0.0210 -0.0144 -0.0475** 0.0089 
 (-1.76) (-2.08) (-1.73) (-1.60) (-1.00) (-2.01) (0.46) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 28531 17705 28328 26186 21691 9510 9511 
adj. R-sq 0.0478 0.0468 0.0467 0.0480 0.0416 0.1050 0.0323 
 
 
Panel C: COUNTT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Raw value of 
Connectedness 
Control for 
Comparability 
Control for 
DD Accrual 
Control for 
F-score 
Control for Tax 
Avoidance 
Low Lead 
Performance Group 
(Bottom Tercile) 
High lead 
Performance Group 
(Top Tercile) 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0513*** -0.0507** -0.0594*** -0.0596*** -0.0509** -0.0727** -0.0079 
 (-3.18) (-2.10) (-3.14) (-3.04) (-2.34) (-2.35) (-0.23) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0790** -0.0903** -0.0784** -0.0566* -0.0579 -0.0746 -0.0607 
 (-2.52) (-2.26) (-2.49) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.33) (-1.19) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 28531 17705 28328 26186 21691 9510 9511 
adj. R-sq 0.0445 0.0438 0.0436 0.0453 0.0369 0.0918 0.0266 
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Table 4 
Differential Impact of Director Social Networks on Crash Risk: CEO Characteristics 
 
This table estimates the pooled cross-sectional relation between director social networks, CEO characteristics, and future stock price crash risk.  We 
measure CEO characteristics based on the following two dimensions: CEO power (that is, a composite measure based on principal component 
analysis in Abernethy, Kuang, and Qin 2015) and CEO ability (i.e., a continuous measure developed in Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012)).  The 
sample covers firm-year observations with non-missing values for all variables for the period 2000 to 2015. To economize on space, all the control 
variables (see Table 2) are suppressed. We report t-statistics in parentheses, based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.  All models 
include year and industry fixed-effects.  *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.   
        
 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0467 -0.0233* -0.0309 -0.0092 -0.0032 0.0295 
 (-1.64) (-1.96) (-1.06) (-0.23) (-0.18) (0.67) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0372 -0.0192 -0.0760* -0.0713 -0.0351 -0.0776 
 (-0.86) (-1.08) (-1.85) (-1.04) (-1.19) (-1.05) 
CONNECTEDNESS* CEO_POWER -0.0336* -0.0176** -0.0500***    
 (-1.82) (-2.39) (-2.91)    
BOARD_CEO_TIE* CEO_POWER 0.0021 0.0069 0.0140    
 (0.07) (0.58) (0.48)    
CEO_POWER 0.0038 -0.0021 -0.0094    
 (0.23) (-0.30) (-0.56)    
CONNECTEDNESS*CEO_ABILITY    -0.0880 -0.0489* -0.1603** 
 
   (-1.37) (-1.81) (-2.35) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE*CEO_ABILITY    0.0064 0.0183 0.0286 
 
   (0.06) (0.39) (0.25) 
CEO_ABILITY    0.0665 0.0392 0.1244** 
 
   (1.15) (1.64) (2.06) 
N 15156 15156 15156 22251 22251 22251 
adj. R-sq 0.0259 0.0457 0.0466 0.0331 0.0561 0.0484 
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Table 5 
Differential Impact of Director Social Networks on Crash Risk: Monitoring by External Auditors 
 
This table estimates the pooled cross-sectional relation between director social networks, monitoring by external auditors, and future stock price 
crash risk.  We measure the monitoring by external auditors based on the following two dimensions: TENURE and SPEC.  The sample covers firm-
year observations with non-missing values for all variables for the period 2000 to 2015. To economize on space, all the control variables (see Table 
2) are suppressed. We report t-statistics in parentheses, based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.  All models include year and 
industry fixed-effects.  *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined 
in Appendix A.   
        
 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0975*** -0.0507*** -0.1159*** -0.0751*** -0.0402*** -0.0796*** 
 (-3.76) (-4.84) (-4.22) (-3.53) (-4.62) (-3.55) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0994** -0.0337* -0.0530 -0.0682* -0.0268* -0.0853** 
 (-2.11) (-1.74) (-1.08) (-1.79) (-1.72) (-2.09) 
CONNECTEDNESS*TENURE 0.0038** 0.0020** 0.0057***    
 (1.99) (2.46) (2.83)    
BOARD_CEO_TIE*TENURE 0.0043 0.0009 -0.0024    
 (1.42) (0.73) (-0.82)    
TENURE -0.0040** -0.0015** -0.0022    
 (-2.25) (-2.10) (-1.28)    
CONNECTEDNESS*SPEC    0.0590* 0.0315** 0.0721** 
 
   (1.70) (2.17) (2.00) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE*SPEC    0.0511 0.0113 0.0132 
 
   (0.91) (0.49) (0.23) 
SPEC    -0.0167 -0.0023 0.0021 
 
   (-0.54) (-0.18) (0.07) 
N 28531 28531 28531 28531 28531 28531 
adj. R-sq 0.0272 0.0480 0.0447 0.0271 0.0480 0.0446 
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Table 6 
Differential Impact of Director Social Networks on Crash Risk: Protection of Shareholder Rights  
 
This table estimates the pooled cross-sectional relation between director social networks, protection of shareholder rights, and future stock price 
crash risk.  We measure the protection of shareholder rights based on the following two dimensions: LO_G (that is, an indicator equal to one if the 
index of Gompers et al (2003) is below the sample median, and zero otherwise) and NOUDL (i.e., an indicator equal to one for the period before the 
state-level adoption of universal demand law, and zero otherwise).  The sample covers firm-year observations with non-missing values for all 
variables for the period 2000 to 2015. To economize on space, all the control variables (see Table 2) are suppressed. We report t-statistics in 
parentheses, based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.  All models include year and industry fixed-effects.  *, **, and *** indicate 
two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
        
 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.1952*** -0.0898*** -0.1522*** -0.0785*** -0.0389*** -0.0847*** 
 (-3.20) (-3.62) (-2.59) (-3.63) (-4.28) (-3.79) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0509 -0.0351 -0.0758 -0.0448 -0.0214 -0.0735* 
 (-0.54) (-0.87) (-0.82) (-1.15) (-1.34) (-1.90) 
CONNECTEDNESS*LO_G -0.1918** -0.0973*** -0.2041***    
 (-2.42) (-2.92) (-2.66)    
BOARD_CEO_TIE*LO_G -0.0045 -0.0193 -0.0557    
 (-0.04) (-0.39) (-0.48)    
LO_G 0.0490 0.0241 0.0761    
 (0.69) (0.82) (1.12)    
CONNECTEDNESS*NOUDL    -0.0602* -0.0249* -0.0756** 
 
   (-1.68) (-1.70) (-2.05) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE*NOUDL    -0.0109 -0.0038 0.0078 
 
   (-0.19) (-0.16) (0.13) 
NOUDL    0.0468* 0.0171 0.0448 
 
   (1.65) (1.46) (1.56) 
N 6314 6314 6314 28366 28366 28366 
adj. R-sq 0.0240 0.0550 0.0484 0.0273 0.0482 0.0447 
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Table 7 
Impact of Director Social Networks on Crash Risk: Director-type Analysis 
 
This table estimates the pooled cross-sectional relation between director social networks and future stock price crash risk. We decompose our 
measure of director external social networks based on the following four distinct classifications for monitoring-type versus non-monitoring-type 
directors: 1) independent directors (IndepD) versus non-independent directors (NonIndepD); 2) audit-committee directors (AuditComD) versus non-
audit-committee directors (NonAuditComD); 3) short-tenured directors (ShortTenD) versus long-tenured directors (LongTenD); and 4) high-
reputation directors (HighRepD) versus low-reputation directors (LowRepD). The sample covers firm-year observations with non-missing values for 
all variables for the period 2000 to 2015. To economize on space, all the control variables (see Table 2) are suppressed. We report t-statistics in 
parentheses, based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.  All models include year and industry fixed-effects.  *, **, and *** indicate 
two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS            
_IndepD -0.0314** -0.0178*** -0.0387**          
 (-2.25) (-3.04) (-2.57)          
_NonIndepD -0.0143 -0.0090** -0.0229**          
 (-1.44) (-2.26) (-2.31)          
_AuditComD    -0.0276** -0.0149*** -0.0346**       
    (-2.03) (-2.72) (-2.52)       
_NonAuditComD    -0.0140 -0.0080* -0.0090       
    (-1.39) (-1.91) (-0.84)       
_ShortTenD       -0.0358** -0.0200*** -0.0451***    
       (-2.44) (-3.34) (-3.01)    
_LongTenD       -0.0165 -0.0086* -0.0207*    
       (-1.51) (-1.87) (-1.76)    
_HighRepD          -0.0372** -0.0167** -0.0245* 
          (-2.95) (-3.28) (-1.85) 
_LowRepD          -0.0307 -0.0175* -0.0207 
          (-1.47) (-2.05) (-0.99) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0502* -0.0238* -0.0799** -0.0450 -0.0215* -0.0750** -0.0344 -0.0179 -0.0708** -0.0059 -0.0070 -0.0637* 
 (-1.66) (-1.90) (-2.54) (-1.47) (-1.70) (-2.36) (-1.06) (-1.35) (-2.17) (-0.16) (-0.49) (-1.80) 
N 28494 28494 28494 27595 27595 27595 21502 21502 21502 25605 25605 25605 
adj. R-sq 0.0270 0.0479 0.0448 0.0254 0.0462 0.0437 0.0238 0.0426 0.0398 0.0244 0.0438 0.0415 
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Table 8 
Director Networks and Bad News Hoarding 
 
This table estimates the pooled cross-sectional relation between director social networks and a series of bad news hoarding channels/signals, 
including opaque financial reporting (OPAQUE), positive and negative discretionary accruals (POS_DA and NEG_DA), meeting and beating 
analyst forecasts using discretionary accruals (MBEAT), real earnings management (ABN_PROD, ABN_DISEXP, and ABN_CFO), tax avoidance 
(CASH_ETR), and short interest ratio (SIR). The sample covers firm-year observations with non-missing values for all variables for the period 2000 
to 2015. To economize on space, all the control variables (see Table 2) are suppressed. We report t-statistics in parentheses, based on White 
standard errors corrected for firm clustering.  All models include year and industry fixed-effects.  *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
           
 OPAQUE POS_DA NEG_DA MBEAT ABN_PROD ABN_DISEXP ABN_CFO CASH_ETR SIR 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0045* -0.0039*** -0.0013* -0.0744** -0.0115*** 0.0095*** 0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0032*** 
 (-1.75) (-5.55) (-1.80) (-2.15) (-3.79) (2.58) (0.64) (-0.50) (-3.18) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0030 -0.0010 0.0001 0.1509** 0.0037 0.0063 0.0012 -0.0020 0.0012 
 (-0.81) (-0.96) (0.12) (2.74) (0.81) (1.08) (0.52) (-0.38) (0.75) 
N 28531 28788 28788 24145 28531 28531 28531 21691 28531 
adj. R-sq 0.2023 0.1330 0.1036 0.034 0.5914 0.5992 0.6018 0.0801 0.2418 
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Table 9 
Differential Impact of Director Social Networks on Crash Risk: Informed Trading  
 
This table estimates the pooled cross-sectional regression on how the relation between director social networks and future stock price crash risk 
varies with informed trading.  We measure informed trading by the following variables: short interest ratio (SIR); the ratio of total monthly put and 
call trading volume to stock trading volume (OPTION/STOCK VOL); the probability of informed trade (PIN); and insider trades (INS_TRADE). The 
sample covers firm-year observations with non-missing values for all variables for the period 2000 to 2015. To economize on space, all the control 
variables (see Table 2) are suppressed. We report t-statistics in parentheses, based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.  All models 
include year and industry fixed-effects.  *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
              
 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CONNECTEDNESS -0.0446** -0.0209** -0.0405* -0.0646** -0.0306** -0.0494 -0.0689* -0.0435*** -0.1243*** -0.0394* -0.0240** -0.0380 
 (-2.13) (-2.37) (-1.78) (-2.13) (-2.42) (-1.60) (-1.74) (-2.70) (-3.03) (-1.68) (-2.48) (-1.54) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0016 -0.0093 -0.0815** -0.0727 -0.0383** -0.1007** -0.1680*** -0.0497* -0.0933 -0.0439 -0.0232 -0.0748* 
 (-0.04) (-0.62) (-2.06) (-1.51) (-1.97) (-2.17) (-2.63) (-1.86) (-1.36) (-1.10) (-1.43) (-1.87) 
CONNECTEDNESS*SIR -0.2245 -0.2203 -0.4948          
 (-0.66) (-1.62) (-1.49)          
BOARD_CEO_TIE*SIR -1.0092* -0.2848 0.0596          
 (-1.76) (-1.26) (0.12)          
SIR 0.7861*** 0.1992* 0.1957          
 (2.75) (1.73) (0.71) 
         
CONNECTEDNESS* 
OPTION/STOCK VOL 
   -5.6711 -4.4405 -3.0147       
   (-0.20) (-0.38) (-0.12)       
BOARD_CEO_TIE* 
OPTION/ STOCK VOL 
   28.0493 15.1381 3.9055       
   (0.65) (0.90) (0.10)       
OPTION/STOCK VOL    14.7547 -0.8266 17.8263       
    (0.53) (-0.08) (0.72)       
CONNECTEDNESS*PIN       0.0336 0.0525 0.2876    
       (0.19) (0.74) (1.58)    
BOARD_CEO_TIE*PIN       0.4319 0.0705 0.0004    
       (1.35) (0.51) (0.00)    
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PIN       -0.2964 0.0343 0.0324    
       (-1.61) (0.44) (0.14)    
CONNECTEDNESS*INS_TRADE        0.0016 0.0005 -0.0094 
          (0.15) (0.11) (-0.76) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE*INS_TRADE        0.0044 0.0066 0.0227 
          (0.21) (0.77) (1.01) 
INS_TRADE          0.0307** 0.0136*** 0.0239** 
          (3.16) (3.52) (2.30) 
N 28531 28531 28531 19173 19173 19173 20744 20744 20744 20041 20041 20041 
adj. R-sq 0.0271 0.0479 0.0445 0.0191 0.0395 0.0400 0.0346 0.0591 0.0519 0.0216 0.0400 0.0398 
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Table 10 
Tests on the Endogeneity of Director Network Size 
 
This table reports the results of endogeneity tests on director network size. Panel A reports the results of the difference-in-difference estimation 
within the subsample of firms whose directors retire during the sample period. POSTRETIRE is set to 1 (0) for the year immediately after (before) 
the director retirement.  LARGE_DECREASE is set to 1 if the absolute value of the decrease in the board network size is above the sample median 
value, and 0 otherwise. Panel B reports the results on the determinants of changes in director networks within the subsample of firms with 
requisite data. ∆CONNECTEDNESS is the change in CONNECTEDNESS from year t-1 to t. To economize on space, all the control variables (see 
Table 2) are suppressed in Panels A and B. We report t-statistics in parentheses, based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.    *, 
**, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
Panel A– Stock price crash risk and director network changes due to retirement 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dep. Var.= NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 NCSKEWT+1 DUVOLT+1 COUNTT+1 
LARGE_DECREASE -0.1183 -0.1167 -0.2469    
 (-0.56) (-1.21) (-0.79)    
POSTRETIRE -0.2906 -0.1412 -0.3432 -2.7241** -1.3487*** -3.5925** 
 (-1.29) (-1.49) (-1.42) (-2.41) (-2.91) (-2.59) 
POSTRETIRE*LARGE_DECREASE 0.6606** 0.3482*** 0.7927** 0.5250 0.2668** 0.7134* 
 (2.17) (2.68) (2.08) (1.59) (1.97) (1.76) 
BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0800 0.0156 0.2158 1.3740** 0.6762** 1.4233* 
 (-0.34) (0.15) (0.76) (2.04) (2.44) (1.72) 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES 
N 422 422 422 422 422 422 
Adjusted R2/Within R2 0.240 0.278 0.228 0.195 0.124 0.227 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
Panel B – Determinants of changes in director networks 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dep. Var.= ∆CONNECTEDNESS ∆CONNECTEDNESS ∆CONNECTEDNESS 
LAG_NCSKEW -0.0008   
 (-0.70)   
LAG_DUVOL  0.0011  
  (0.44)  
LAG_COUNT   0.0010 
   (1.08) 
LAG_BOARD_CEO_TIE -0.0122*** -0.0121*** -0.0121*** 
 (-3.00) (-2.99) (-2.98) 
LAG_DIV 0.0078** 0.0076** 0.0076** 
 (2.14) (2.09) (2.08) 
LAG_KUR 0.0004** 0.0003** 0.0003** 
 (2.46) (2.19) (2.26) 
LAG_SIGMA 0.2493 0.2144 0.2217 
 (0.54) (0.46) (0.48) 
LAG_RET 14.5025 13.3130 13.3175 
 (1.41) (1.30) (1.30) 
LAG_MB 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.74) (0.80) (0.83) 
LAG_LEV -0.0390*** -0.0390*** -0.0390*** 
 (-4.41) (-4.41) (-4.40) 
LAG_LNSIZE -0.0051*** -0.0050** -0.0050** 
 (-2.63) (-2.57) (-2.55) 
LAG_ROA -0.0060 -0.0062 -0.0064 
 (-0.35) (-0.37) (-0.38) 
LAG_OPAQUE 0.0354** 0.0354** 0.0354** 
 (2.50) (2.51) (2.50) 
LAG_SIR -0.0083 -0.0086 -0.0095 
 (-0.28) (-0.29) (-0.32) 
LAG_SPEC -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0024 
 (-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.79) 
LAG_ABN_PROD 0.0201 0.0202* 0.0202* 
 (1.64) (1.65) (1.65) 
LAG_ABN_DISEXP -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0007 
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 (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.08) 
LAG_ABN_CFO 0.0103 0.0105 0.0107 
 (0.56) (0.57) (0.58) 
LAG_DTURN 0.0139 0.0139 0.0138 
 (0.77) (0.77) (0.76) 
LAG_AGE 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
 (2.07) (2.07) (2.07) 
LAG_TENURE 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.86) (0.86) (0.85) 
LAG_BIGN -0.0131** -0.0131** -0.0131** 
 (-2.31) (-2.33) (-2.33) 
LAG_ANA 0.0247*** 0.0244*** 0.0243*** 
 (7.90) (7.80) (7.79) 
LAG_INST -0.0084 -0.0084 -0.0084 
 (-1.39) (-1.39) (-1.39) 
LAG_DISTANCE 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 
 (0.69) (0.70) (0.72) 
_CONS 0.0949** 0.0940** 0.0934** 
 (2.10) (2.09) (2.07) 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 
N 20421 20421 20421 
 
 
